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A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF
MILITARY REGULATIONS RESTRICTING
THE WEARING OF MILITARY UNIFORMS
BY MEMBERS OF THE INDIVIDUAL READY
RESERVE WHO PARTICIPATE IN
POLITICALLY THEMED THEATRICAL
PRODUCTIONS
Abstract: Adam Kokesh, a veteran of the Iraq War and a member of the
Individual Ready Reserve, performed a public reenactment of combat in
Iraq while wearing elements of his military uniform. Although federal
statutes permit the wearing of a military uniform during such expression,
the United States Marine Corps punished Kokesh based on his violation
of military regulations. This Note explains that Kokesh's experience is
representative of a policy by which the uniform-related expression of
members of the Individual Ready Reserve has been restricted to a greater
degree than that of the general public. After examining three available
First Amendment standards by which this additional restriction might be
evaluated, this Note concludes that the most appropriate standard is the
standard for the regulation of expressive conduct and that the imposition
of this additional restriction on the uniform-related expression of mem-
bers of the Individual Ready Reserve fails to satisfy that standard.
INTRODUCTION
Adam Kokesh served as a United States Marine in the Iraq War)
After returning to the United States, he received an honorable discharge
from active duty and became a graduate student at George Washington
University.2 Kokesh sought to communicate to the public both the nature
of his experiences in combat and his opinions about the morality of the
continuing occupation of haq. 3 Pursuing this goal, Kokesh and other
veterans donned elements of military uniforms and staged a reenact-
I See David Montgomery, Antiwar to the Corps, %VASIL POST, May 31, 2007, at Cl.
2 See id.
See id.; see also Dave !gelling, Marine's War Protest Brings Charges, Clash, KAN. CITY STAR
(Mo.), June 1, 2007, at Al.
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ment of a typical mission in Iraq on the streets of Washington, D.C., in
the spring of 2007. 4
Federal statutes permit the wearing of a military uniform in this
context.5 Military regulations governing servicemembers in the active
and reserve components, however, prohibit the wearing of military uni-
forms in such performances. 6 Kokesh, like tens of thousands of other
veterans of recent wars, was a member of the Individual Ready Reserve
("IRR"), a reserve component of the military. 7 Members of the IRR es-
sentially live and work as civilians but may be recalled to active duty in
times of national emergency. 6
Following the event in Washington, D.C., a photo taken of Kokesh
during the event appeared in a prominent newspaper.9 Within days,
officers at the highest levels of the Marine Corps hierarchy initiated
disciplinary action against Kokesh and two other IRR members who
wore uniform items at antiwar protests.° Kokesh was stripped of his
honorable discharge and was administratively separated from the IRR."
In general, such involuntary administrative separation can result in lim-
ited access to veterans' benefits and may interfere with efforts to secure
civilian et nployment.°
This Note considers the question of whether the First Amendment
permits the government to restrict the uniform-related expression of
1KR members when it has declined to restrict such expression in the
general public.° Part I of this Note briefly describes the historical prac-
tices of veterans' organizations, examines situations in which IRR mem-
bers may be disciplined for engaging in similar practices, and explains
that non-veterans may lawfully engage in at least some of the uniform-
related expression for which IRR members may be punished." Part II
articulates three available standards for evaluating whether the imposi-
tion of additional restrictions on IRR members' expression denies to
4 See Montgomery, supra note 1.
5 See 10 U.S.C.§ 772(f) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). See generally Schacht v. United
States. 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (stating that (he exceptions listed in 10 U.S.C. § 772 limit the
applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 702 and that street skits fall within § 772(f)).
See infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
7 See Montgomery, supra note I.
5 See infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
9 See David Montgomery, Far front Iraq, a Demonstration of a 4Var Zone, WASII. Posy, Mar.
20,2007, at Cl.
to Sec infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
ti See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 214-312 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 17-105 and accompanying text.
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them the guarantees of the First Amendment. 15
 Part III argues that the
most appropriate test of constitutionality is the standard for the regula-
tion of expressive conduct and concludes that the imposition of addi-
tional restrictions on IRR members' expression fails to satisfy the re-
quirements of that standard. 16
I. VETERANS, MILITARY UNIFORMS, AND PUBLIC EXPRESSION
A. Historical Context
War veterans have traditionally exercised substantial influence over
the nation's political process." Following the Civil War, military veterans
comprised roughly five percent of the population and organized the
nation's first veterans' organization, the Grand Army of the Republic, in
order to maximize the impact of their considerable political influence.I 8
This power was exercised in large part to elect favored candidates to
public office and to secure pensions for former servicemembers. 19
 Simi-
larly, following World War I, veterans' organizations such as the Ameri-
can Legion lobbied for additional compensation for servicemembers."
These organizations initially secured a discharge bonus as well as the
promise of an additional payment due to each veteran in 1945 or to the
next of kin at the time of the veteran's death. 21
 Faced with the hardship
of the Great Depression, organized groups of veterans secured the early
payment of this bonus in 1936. 22
As the nation prosecuted the protracted campaign in Vietnam, war
veterans exercised a somewhat different form of advocacy, the criticism
of a prolonged and continuing conflict by veterans who had quite re-
cently been participants in that same conflict." Members of Vietnam
15 See infra notes 106-213 and accompanying text.
' a
 See infra notes 214-312 and accompanying text.
17 See PAUL. DICKSON & THOMAS B. ALLEN, THE BONUS ARMY 2 (2004).
18 See id. at 4.
19 See id. In the 1870s, more than 20% of the national budget was allocated for the
payment of veterans' benefits. See id.
" See id. at 20-21.
2' See id. at 20-21,28,29. Support for the delayed payment was so strong that Congress
overrode the President's veto of the act. See id. at 29.
22 See DICKSON & ALLEN, supra note 17, at 253. This early payment was also accom-
plished through an override of the President's veto. See id.
23
 See, e.g., ANDREW E. HUNT, THE TURNING, A HISTORY OF VIETNAM VETERANS
AGAINST THE WAR 8-9 (1999) (describing the activities of Donald Duncan, who became a
full-time antiwar activist within months of resigning front the U.S. Army Special Forces
after serving eighteen months in Vietnam and receiving several decorations for bravery in
combat).
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Veterans Against the War ("VVAW") participated in televised debates, 24
engaged in public demonstrations of antiwar sentiment, 25 testified be-
fore Congress, 26
 placed statements in major newspapers, 27 held public
hearings in which veterans described their wartime experiences, 25
 and
executed "guerrilla theater" performances in which uniformed veter-
ans reenacted wartime experiences in public locations. 29 Although
sympathetic organizations composed of veterans of earlier wars offered
to assimilate the Vietnam veterans, members of VVAW declined due to
a belief that the VVAW organization would acquire greater public credi-
bility if it was composed exclusively of veterans of the current conflict."
While advocating for an end to the Vietnam War, members of
VVAW employed the components of military uniforms in order to
achieve several objectives. 81 First, VVAW members wore elements of
military uniforms in order to communicate and confirm their status as
recently discharged veterans, an element of personal identity to which
they attributed the unique credibility of their message. 92 Second, mem-
24 See GERALD NICOSIA, HOME 'to WAR: A HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM VETERANS' MOVE-
mENT 25 (2001).
23 See Hamid Mowlana & Paul H. Geffert, Vietnam l'eterans Against the War: A Pivfile Study
of the Dissenters, in JOHN KERRY Se VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, THE NEW SOLDIER
172 (1971) (stating that approximately 2300 veterans appeared for a demonstration in
Washington, D.C., on April 23, 1971).
2° See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, TOUR OF DUTY 371 (2004) (describing WAW member John
Kerry's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
27 See NtcosiA, supra note 24, at 25.
28 See HUNT, supra note 23, at 69-72 (describing VVAW's "Winter Soldier Investiga-
tion," in which more than 100 Vietnam veterans publicly related their recollections of the
war, including numerous descriptions of atrocities committed by U.S. servicemembers).
29 See id. at 50 (describing instances in which VVAW members wearing combat attire
reenacted village searches and feigned capturing, torturing, and killing mock detainees).
"Guerrilla theater" performances seem to have been a particularly effective method of
causing observers to reconsider their support for the war. See id. at 51.
3° See id. at 11 (quoting a founding member of VVAW as stating that, although the Vet-
erans for Peace "would have preferred that we stay under their umbrella," such a relation-
ship would anise VVAW to "los[e] that direct ability for us to say, 'We've been there. This is
the experience.'"); NICOSIA, supra note 24, at 17 (stating that VVAW declined to merge
with existing veterans' groups and limited membership to Vietnam veterans because "the
particular leverage they had was in speaking as veterans of this very war" and "Epleople
would listen to them about Vietnam because they had been there").
31
 See NICOSIA, supra note 24, at 60,101,140-43.
32 See id. at 101 (stating that, in response to insinuations by President Nixon that many
members of VVAW were not actually veterans, VVAW encouraged participants in a demon-
stration in Washington, D.C., to wear their uniforms and medals during the event as proof
of their authenticity); see also KERRY Be VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, Supra Dole
25, at 10 (suggesting that, after hosting one event in which many observers did not believe
the speakers were actually Vietnam veterans, members of VVAW wore uniform items to a
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hers of VVAW symbolically returned to the U.S. government awards
typically displayed on military uniforms in order to communicate re-
gret for participation in the conflict." Third, those members who par-
ticipated in "guerrilla theater" performances wore uniform items as
theatrical props, objects which increased the realism and accessibility of
the performance for the audience. 34
B. Current Restrictions
Recently, it has become apparent that many veterans of the Iraq
War may not enjoy the freedom to wear or otherwise utilize elements of
a military uniform while communicating a message of dissent." The
United States Marine Corps has adopted a policy under which a sub-
stantial percentage of returning war veterans who have departed active
service may be punished for wearing a military uniform during the pe-
riod of time when their impressions of and experiences in an ongoing
conflict might be most relevant to the nation's political discourse. 36
Punishment of veterans under this policy may be inflicted in situations
in which a civilian with no connection to the military could not be sub-
jected to criminal sanction."
I. The Individual Ready Reserve
With few exceptions, every person who joins the United States
Armed Forces must serve for a minimum period of between six and
eight years.38
 Not all of that service must be performed on active duty,
however." Rather, servicemembers who complete their active duty coin-
subsequent public demonstration so that each member would have some proof that he
had been in Vietnam").
33
 See Nicosm, supra note 24 at 140-43 (describing the incident in which hundreds of
VVAW members returned awards to the U.S. government by throwing them onto the steps
of the Capitol).
34 See KERRY & VIETNAM VETERANS AGA INST1/IE WAR, supra note 25, at 28 (picturing a
veteran wearing a combat uniform and helmet while participating in a mock search-and-
destroy mission); !sitcom, supra note 24, at 60 (relating that VVAW members participating
in Operation RAW, an 86-mile march, the centerpiece of which was a set of guerrilla thea-
ter demonstrations, were directed to wear their combat fatigues and pistol belts and
brought additional props such as toy rifles and body bags).
35
 Sec Trista Talton, War Protester's Case Raises Questions About IRR Rules, MARINE CORPS
TIMES, June 25,2007, at 31.
36 See id.
37 See generally Schacht v. United States, 399 U.S. 58 (1970); Montgomery, supra note 1.
" See 10 U.S.C. § 651(a) (2006).
39 See id.
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mitment may perform the remainder of their service in the reserve
component.4°
The reserve component exists "to provide trained units and
qualified persons ... to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever
more units and persons are needed."'" The reserve component is di-
vided into a Ready Reserve, a Standby Reserve, and a Retired Re-
serve.42 The Ready Reserve is further subdivided into the Selected Re-
serve and the Individual Ready Reserve ("IRR").° Many members of
the IRR are servicemembers who have elected to depart the armed
forces following their required period of active duty but who have not
yet completed their statutory military service obligation." Others re-
main in the IRR voluntarily or to complete a contractual service obli-
gation extending beyond the statutory requirement.°
The IRR is not a military unit in the conventional sense but is in-
stead a pool of experienced personnel upon whom the military may
draw in times of national need." Senicemembers who enter the IRR
remain connected to the military only in that they may be involuntarily
recalled to active duty and retain certain ministerial obligations. 47
Unless activated to perform training functions, muster duty, or opera-
tional activities, servicemembers in the IRR receive no salary from the
military and are not entitled to benefits such as medical or dental
care. 48 Additionally, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (the "UCMJ")
4° See id. § 651 (b).
1 10 U.S.C. § 10102 (2006).
42 Id. § 10141.
" Id. §§ 10143-10144.
" See 10 U.S.C. § 651 (a)—(b); DEPT or Dim, DIRECTIVE No. 1235.13 13.2 (2005)
[hereinafter DIRECTIVE 1235.13].
45 See DIRECTIVE 1235.13, supra note 44,1 3.2.
46 See id. Approximately 158,000 servicemembers in the Army or Marine Corps are
currently assigned to the IRR. See Montgomery; supra note 1.
1 ' See 10 U.S.C. § 10144; id. § 12301(a) (permitting involuntary activation in time of war
or national emergency); id. § 12302(a) (permitting involuntary activation in time of national
emergency declared by the President); id. § 12304(a)—(b) (permitting activation to augment
the force for an operational mission or to respond to certain emergency circumstances).
Members of the IRR must notify "the Secretary concerned of any change in the member's
address, marital status, number of dependents, or civilian employment and of any change in
the member's physical condition that would prevent the member from meeting the physical
or mental standards prescribed for the member's armed force." Id. § 10205(a). Additionally,
members of the IRR may be required to muster once per year for no more than one day
(including travel to and from the muster location) and to submit to physical examinations to
determine physical fitness for various activities. See id. §§ 10206(b), 12319(a)—(b).
48 See 10 U.S.C. § 1074(a) (2) (A)—(B) (2006) (limiting the entitlement to military medi-
cal and dental care to servicemembers on active duty and officers who have been recently
commissioned and who are awaiting the delivery of orders to an initial period of active
2008]	 The First Amendment, Military Uniforms & the Ready Reserve
	 1137
does not permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the military
over a member of the IRR unless the servicemember has been ordered
to participate in inactive duty training, has been recalled to active duty,
or has voluntarily subjected himself to military authority. 49 A service-
member in the IRR lives and works as a civilian. 50
2. Mechanism for Control of IRR Members
Although IRR members are not subject to prosecution under the
UCMJ or to military discipline in the conventional sense, the Marine
Corps may respond to a "serious offense" by an IRR member by initiat-
ing administrative separation.51
 An offense is considered serious for this
purpose when "the specific circumstances of the offense warrant sepa-
ration" and "a punitive discharge would be authorized for the same or a
closely related offense under the UCMJ." 52
 This reference to the UCMJ
exists only to describe the magnitude of the required offense, and no
military or civilian conviction is necessary to initiate an administrative
separation under these circumstances. 53
 Violation of UCMJ article 92
(failure to obey an order or regulation) is a crime that may be pun-
duty); 37 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2) (2000) {limiting the entitlement to basic pay to members of
the reserve component who are "participating in full-time training, training duty with pay,
or other full-time duty"); id. § 433(a)—(b) (authorizing payment of a per diem allowance to
a member of the W.R who is required to muster for at least two hours). But see 10 U.S.C.
§ 1063{13) (granting Secretary of Defense discretion to permit IRR members to use military
commissary stores and retail facilities); Press Release, U.S. Dept of Def., Reserve and Guard
Receive Unlimited Commissary Benefits (Nov. 24, 2003), available at http://wwwde-
fenselink.mil/releases/release.aspxPreleaseid=5815
 (declining to limit access of IRR mem-
bers to military commissary stores).
49
 Seel° U .S.C. § 802(a) (1), (a) (3), (c), (d) (2) (2006).
55 See Kevin D. Hartzell, Note, Voluntary Warriors: Reserve Force Mobilization in the United
States and Canada, 29 CORNELL INT1 U. 537, 539 n.8 (1996) (stating that "Individual
Ready Reservists are not assigned to units and do not train"); David Montgomery, In Clash
with Marines, Reservists Gain Ally in VFW, WASH. Post', June 2. 2007, at CI (noting that IRR
members ''aren't paid, don't drill, have no chain of command, yet may be recalled to active
duty during the few years they are on inactive reserve"); see also Brendan 1. Koerner, You're
in the Army Now (and Forever), SLATE, June 29, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2103118/
(stating that members of the IRR "return to the civilian world," are not "attached to a spe-
cific unit," and that "many IRRists aren't even aware that they're in the reserves at all").
5.1 See HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, MARINE CORPS SEPARATION AND RETIRE-
MENT MANUAL 1 6210(6) (2007) [hereinafter MARCORSEPMAN], available at http://
www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCO%20P1900.16F%20W%2OCH%201-2
.pdf. Congress has granted to the Secretary of Defense a general and delegable authority
to prescribe conditions under which an enlisted servicemember may be discharged before
his term of service expires. See 10 U.S.C. § 1169(1) (2006).
52 See MARCORSEPMAN, supra note 51, ¶ 6210(6).
51 See id.
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ished by a punitive discharge under the UCMJ, and, therefore, the Ma-
rine Corps considers such disobedience to constitute a serious offense
for the purposes of administrative separation. 54
Although administrative separation is not punitive, it is adverse in
the sense that the servicemember is fired and may be assigned an un-
desirable characterization of service upon discharge. 55 Involuntary dis-
charge or a service characterization of "general" or "other than honor-
able" may limit access to certain veterans' benefits56 and may pose an
obstacle to obtaining civilian employment. 57 Administrative separation
for a serious offense generally results in a characterization of service of
"other than honorable," but the more favorable characterization of
54 See JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS, U.S. NAVY, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
UNITED STATES § 4 ]E 16e(1), app. 11 I b(11)—(13) (2008) [hereinafter MGM), available at
http://wwwjag ,navy.mil/documents/mcm2008.pdf; E-mail identified as USMC (14) (June
4, 2007, 06:50 EST) (on file with author). la preparation for this Note, the author re-
quested relevant documents from Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Forces Reserve,
and Marine Corps Mobilization Command under the Freedom of Information Act. Docu-
ments labeled "USMC" refer to responsive records provided by Headquarters Marine
Corps. Although the names of the authors and recipients of these records were redacted
prior to release, it is possible to discern the general contours of the Marine Corps' re-
sponse to this incident.
Other UCMJ violations that may result in a punitive discharge and therefore qualify as
grounds for administrative separation include the making of "disloyal statements." See
MCM, supra, § 4 1 72e. Disloyal statements typically "involve either political or moral ob-
jections to governmental actions or policies." John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Afilitary Com-
munity: Striking a Balance Between Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REv. 303,
315 (1998). Consequently, the use of administrative discharge as a disciplinary tool against
IRR members could potentially disrupt political speech that, in a purely civilian context,
lies at the core of First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,
2626 (2007) ("Political speech, of course, is 'at the core of what the First Amendment is
designed to protect.'" (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003))).
55 See MARCORSEPMAN, supra note 51,11 1002(7), 1004(2).
56 See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 3011(a) (3) (B) (2000) (limiting educational assistance in most
circumstances to veterans who receive a discharge from active duty characterized as hon-
orable).
57 See Rew v. Ward, 402 F. Stipp. 331, 341 (D.N.M. 1975) (stating that employers are
likely to make additional inquiries regarding an applicant's service "any time something
differs from the norm"); see also Casey s United States, 8 CI. Ct. 234, 242 (Cl. Ct. 1985)
(stating that even an administrative discharge with a characterization of honorable is likely
to interfere with subsequent employment applications because prospective employers "do
know and understand the importance of separation codes" included in discharge forms).
See generally David S. Franke, Administrative Separation from the Military: A Due Process Analysis,
ARMY LAW., Oct. 1990, at 11 (describing the relationship between due process analysis and
the adverse effect of an administrative discharge on subsequent civilian employment pros-
pects).
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"general (under honorable conditions)" may be warranted in some cir-
cumstances."
Because administrative separation may be justified by the commis-
sion of a serious offense, and because violation of a regulation is con-
sidered a serious offense, an IRR member who wears a military uniform
in a manner forbidden by Department of Defense ("DoD") regulations
may be administratively discharged." DoD regulations forbid members
of the Armed Forces (including retired members and members of Re-
serve components) from wearing military uniforms "[d]nring or in
connection with furthering political activities . . . when an inference of
official sponsorship for the activity or interest may be drawn," when
"participating in activities such as unofficial public speeches, interviews,
picket lines, marches, rallies or any public demonstration ... may imply
Service sanction of the cause for which the demonstration or activity is
conducted," and "when wearing of the uniform may tend to bring dis-
credit upon the Armed Forces."6° Consequently, the current military
policy permits the administrative discharge of an IRR member who
wears a military uniform while engaged in a public demonstration of po-
58
 MARCORSEPMAN, supra note 51, 1 6210(1). For 1RR members, conduct in the ci-
vilian community may form the basis for a discharge characterization of "other than hon-
orable" only when the conduct "directly affects the performance of military duties (service
related)," whereas such conduct may form the basis for a discharge characterization of
"general (under honorable circumstances)" when the conduct merely "adversely affects
the overall effectiveness of the Marine Corps including military morale and efficiency." Sec
id. 1 1004(4)(d).
69 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
Dar"r or Dm., INsTaucTuax No. 1334.01 11 3.1, 3.1.2—.4 (2005) [hereinafter IN-
STRUCTION 1334.01] (codified at 32 C.F.R. § 53.2). Additionally, the Marine Corps maintains
service-specific uniform regulations that also proscribe the wearing of military uniforms in
certain circumstances. See HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, ORDER PI 020.3•16 11 1/CH I —
4, at 1-5 (2003); Wear of the Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform, ALMAR 035/07 ( July
25, 2007), http://www.marines ,mil/news/messages/Pages/2007/WEAROFTHEMARINE-
CORPSCOMBATUTTLITNUNIFORM.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2008), These regulations, like
other restrictions on military expression, advance several important government interests,
including the maintenance of civilian supremacy over the armed forces and good order and
discipline within the military establishment. See Detlev F. Vagts, Free Speech in the Armed Forces,
57 CoLunt, L, REV, 187, 188-89 (1957); see also ChiefJustice Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and
the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L REV. 181, 186 (1962) ("Thus it is plain that the axiom of subordina-
tion of the military to the civil is not an anachronism. Rather, it is so deeply rooted in our
national experience that it must be regarded as an essential constituent of the fabric of our
political life."). Such regulations, however, may also harm countervailing government inter-
ests, such as minimizing intrusions on basic and fundamental liberties, providing a relatively
harmless outlet for military discontent, ensuring that military service is sufficiently appealing
to attract and retain personnel, and preventing the grant of "a dangerous monopoly to offi-
cial dogma that may shelter a stagnation and inefficiency we can ill afford in these swift and
perilous times.' See Vagts, supra, at 190-91,
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liticai opinion, including activities that were often employed by VVAW,
such as public assembly and guerrilla theater.61
3. Recent Application of the Mechanism for Control of IRR Members
On March 19, 2007, members of Iraq Veterans Against the War
("IVAN") participated in a guerrilla theater performance in Washing-
ton, D.C.62 Dressed in elements of military uniforms, 1VAW members
carried out a mock patrol, employed imaginary weapons, detained
simulated enemy personnel, and portrayed reactions to sniper fire and
friendly casualties. 63 The purpose of the demonstration was to educate
members of the general public who, according to IVAW members, are
largely ignorant of the nature and difficulty of military activities in
Iraq.64 Adam Kokesh, a Marine who fought in Fallujah, Iraq, and who
was awarded the Combat Action Ribbon and the Navy and Marine
Corps Commendation Medal, participated in the performance.° At the
time of the presentation, Kokesh had been honorably discharged from
active duty and was a member of the Marine Corps IRR. 66 During the
performance, Kokesh wore elements of the distinctive Marine Corps
camouflage uniform from which he had removed personal insignia,
such as his name tag.67 Photographs of Kokesh participating in the
event appeared in the Washington Post. 68
On or about March 22, 2007, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, the service's highest ranking officer, directed subordinates to
identify Marines who appeared in uniform in media reports of anti-
war activities and to forward that information to appropriate subordi-
nate commands with instructions to initiate disciplinary action. 69 In
response to this command, Headquarters Marine Corps Judge Advo-
cate Division staff rapidly identified three Marines in the IRR ("IRR
Marines") who had been photographed in uniform at antiwar activi-
61 See INSTRUCTION 1334.01, supra note 60, II 3.1, 3.1.2—.4: see also Lt. Col. Jeffrey P.
Sexton, Limitations on the Wearing of the Uniform by Members of the Armed Services at Non-
Military Events, ARMY LAW., Mar. 2008, at 32 (discussing applicability of Instruction 1334.01
to public demonstrations of antiwar sentiment, including guerrilla theater).
62 See Montgomery, supm note 9.
65 See id.
64 See id.
65 See Montgomery, supra note 1.
66 Sec id.
67 See Trista Talton, Rift Marines Face Punishment for Anti-War Protests, Comments, MARINE
Coin's Tim Es, June 11, 2007, at 12.
68 See id.; see also Montgomery, supra note 9.
06 Sce E-mail identified as USMC (01) (Mar. 22, 2007, 12:18 EST) (on file with author).
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ties." One of the IRR Marines was Adam Kokesh, who was identified
based on the photographs of the March 19 guerrilla theater perform-
ance that appeared in the Washington Post:71
 By the end of the day on
March 22, Headquarters Marine Corps forwarded the information
regarding the IRR Marines to the Staff Judge Advocate at Marine
Forces Reserve and indicated to the subordinate command that a re-
port of the disciplinary action taken against the IRR Marines was an
"item of interest" for the Commandant of the Marine Corps." Marine
Forces Reserve in turn forwarded the information to its own subordi-
nate command, Marine Corps Mobilization Command, which most
directly administers the IRR. 73
On April 19, 2007, Marine Forces Reserve reported to Headquar-
ters Marine Corps that Marine Corps Mobilization Command had
completed the investigation and initiated action to administratively
separate two of the IRR Marines, including Kokesh, from the IRR. 74
7° Sec E-mail identified as USMC (02) (Mar. 22, 2007, 12:55 EST) (on file with author)
(identifying Corporal Cloy Richards in photograph of an event on March 17, 2007); E-mail
identified as USMC (04) (Mar. 22, 2007, 14:23 EST) (on file with author) (identifying Ser-
geant Liam Madden as a uniformed protester); E-mail identified as USMC (05) (Mar, 22,
2007, 15:56 EST) (on file with author) (identifying Corporal Adam Kokesh as a uniformed
protester in the Montgomery piece); E-mail identified as USMC (06) (Mar. 22, 2007, 16:53
EST) (on file with author) (stating Judge Advocate Division personnel identified the IRR
Marines).
71 See E-mail identified as USMC (05), supra note 70.
72 See E-mail identified as USMC (07) (Mar. 22, 2007, 18:11 EST) (on file with author).
73 See id.
74 See E-mail identified as USMC (09) (Apr. 19, 2007, 18:11 EST) (on file with author).
E-mail USMC (09) indicates that the Marine Corps was acutely aware of the fact that disci-
plinary action must be limited to administrative separation because the Uniform Code of
Military Justice does not grant the military jurisdiction over the misconduct of IRR mem-
bers acting as civilians. See id.
Marine Corps Mobility Command did not elect to initiate administrative separation
proceedings against Corporal Richards because Richards "sincerely acknowledged his re-
serve obligations and his intent to abide by uniform regulations in the future." See id.
Richards was left 80% disabled by two deployments to Iraq and agreed to cease wearing his
uniform at antiwar events due to his concern that disciplinary action would result in the
reduction of his disability benefits. See David Montgomery, Marinas Reduce Penalty for Reserv-
ist-Protester, WASH. POSTJUIle 5, 2007, at C2.
The Marine Corps initiated proceedings to administratively separate Sergeant Madden
in response to his wearing of a partial uniform at an antiwar march and in response to his
making "disloyal statements" at times when he was not wearing uniform items. See Mont-
gomery, supra note 1; E-mail identified as USMC (09), supra. Madden was already a person
of interest to the Marine Corps due to his efforts to encourage active duty servicemembers
to express opposition to the Iraq War to their elected representatives and had been for-
mally warned in 2006 to cease wearing his uniform at antiwar events. See Rick Maze & Wil-
liam H. McMichael, Troops Call for End to Iraq War in Letter to Congress, MARINE CORPS
Tutus, Jan. 29, 2007, at 23; E-mail identified as USMC (04), supra note 70; E-mail identi-
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On June 4, 2007, an administrative separation board concluded that
Kokesh had committed serious offenses—one of which was apparently
the violation of uniform regulations—and should be discharged with
a characterization of general (under honorable conditions). 75 Kokesh
was discharged from the IRR on June 11, 2007. 76 Had he not been
administratively separated, Kokesh's obligation to serve in the IRR
would have expired on June 18, 2007, and he would not have been
eligible to reenlist."
fied as USMC (09), supra. By late June 2007, the Marine Corps ceased its attempt to dis-
charge Madden, ostensibly because he had agreed to cease wearing his uniform at political
events. Sec Stephanie Ebbert, Marine Corps Drops Case Against Antiwar Reservist, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 30, 2007, at B3. Madden strongly disputed the assertion that he agreed to
curtail his activities and has stated that he intends to continue to wear his uniform at anti-
war events so that observers will "know who the veterans are when they see a protest walk-
ing by." See id.
75 See Montgomery, supra note 74; Sergeant Kokesh Goes to Washington, http://
kokesh.blogspot.com/2007/06/gonzo-reporting-from-kangaroo-courchtml (June 19, 2007,
10:59 EST) (recounting that the discharge board stated that Kokesh's administrative separa-
tion was justified by his commission of serious offenses). It should be noted that Kokesh's
discharge was not solely based upon his wearing of his military uniform at a political event.
See Talton, supra note 67; see also Dave Helling, Brass Baths Marine's General Discharge, KAN.
City STAR (Mo.), June 14, 2007, at A2 (stating that Kokesh was punished "for his actions in a
March war protest and his subsequent obscene communication" (emphasis added)); Dave
Helling, Marine Protester Denied Rehearing, KAN. CITY STAR (Mo.), June 7, 2007, at AS (stating
that Kokesh was discharged "for wearing a stripped-down uniform to a war protest and using
an obscenity in an e-mail to a Marine officer" (emphasis added)). In addition to the uniform-
related charge, Kokesh was also charged with making disrespectful comments to an officer
after he told a Major investigating the uniform incident to "go fuck yourself." See Helling,
supra note 3; E-mail identified as USMC (09), supra note 74. This Note will not assess whether
this statement, absent the uniform-related charge, would independently justify administrative
separation or invoke First Amendment protections. The Marine Corps has implied that
Kokesh would not have been separated had he not compounded his uniform-related offense
by using disrespectful language and by refusing to agree to cease wearing the uniform at
similar events. Set E-mail identified as USMC (13) (June, 3, 2007, 21:33 EST) (on file with
author); E-mail identified as USMC (24) ( June 8, 2007, 16;50 EST) (on file with author)
(advising that a photo depicting a retired Marine Corps officer in uniform that had been
posted on the •ebsite of a private company for whom the officer served as a member of the
Board of Advisors would not result in disciplinary action because, even if officials "deter-
mine[d] that the photo was not in compliance with regulations, you can bet [redacted]
wouldn't respond the way Cpl Kokesh did (both in word and deed)"). Any suggestion that
the disrespectful speech issue rather than the uniform issue was determinative is called into
question by the fact that Sergeant Madden also declined to cease wearing the uniform at
political events and explicitly compared investigating officers to "German Colonels in
1939" and, yet, was not discharged. See Ebbert, supra note 74.
76
 See Talton, supra note 35.
77 See Talton, supra note 67.
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C. Disparate Rights
At first glance, it would appear that federal law prohibits persons
with no military affiliation from engaging in the same type of guerrilla
theater performance that resulted in Kokesh's discharge. 78 Section 702
of title 18 of the U.S. Code imposes criminal sanctions on "[w]hoever
, without authority, wears the uniform or a distinctive part thereof
or anything similar to a distinctive part of the uniform of any of the
armed forces of the United States ...."78 Similarly, 10 U.S.C. § 771
states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, no person except a
member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps" may wear a
military uniform, a distinctive part of a military uniform, or uniform
items similar to a distinctive part of a military uniform. 8° Section 772 of
title 10, entitled "When wearing by persons not on active duty author-
ized," lists a series of exceptions to the blanket prohibition on the wear-
big of military uniforms by persons without authority. 81 Among those
exceptions is § 772(1), a provision stating that "hvpiile portraying a
member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, an actor in a
theatrical or motion-picture production may wear the uniform of that
armed force if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed
force."82 Because it is not clear that guerrilla theater is a "theatrical
production" and because a street performance intended to demon-
strate the unpleasant conduct of military combatants could tend to dis-
credit the armed forces, this statutory scheme presumably does not
permit guerrilla theater performances by persons with no military
f"il iation.8s.3
In 1970, however, in Schacht v. United States, the U.S. Supreme
Court considered whether or not the prosecution of a participant in a
guerrilla theater production under this statutory scheme violated con-
stitutional protections. 84 In 1967, while participating in what the Court
termed a "street skit," Daniel Schacht wore "a blouse of the type cur-
78 See 10 U.S.C. § 771 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). This Note uses the phrase "per-
sons with no military affiliation" to refer to persons who are not presently serving in either
an active or a reserve component of the military. A member of the 1RR is, by definition,
serving in a reserve component of the military and is therefore not a person with no mili-
tary affiliation. See supra notes 41-43.
79
 18 U.S.C. § 702.
60 10 U.S.C. § 771.
81 Id. § 772; see Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61 (stating that the exceptions listed in 10 U.S.C..
§ 772 modify the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 702).
62 10 U.S.C. § 772 (f) .
63 See id. §§ 771-772; 18 U.S.C. § 702.
94 See 398 U.S. at 61, 62.
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rently authorized for Army enlisted men," buttons that were "of the of-
ficial Army design," and a piece of obsolete military headgear to which
he had affixed "the eagle insignia currently worn on the hats of Army
officers."85 Schacht and two associates prepared a performance and
then publicly presented their skit in front of the Armed Forces Induc-
tion Center in Houston, Texas." The skit depicted two soldiers shoot-
ing a suspected enemy operative and then discovering that they had in
fact killed a pregnant woman. 87 Schacht was indicted for a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 702, convicted by a jury, and sentenced to pay a fine and to
serve six months in prison. 88
The Court faced three distinct questions. 89 First, was it permissible
for Congress to ban the wearing of military uniforms without authority
as in 18 U.S.C. § 702?" Second, did Schacht's conduct qualify him as an
"actor ... in a 'theatrical production'" for the purposes of the excep-
tion established by 10 U.S.C. § 772(f)?91 Third, was it permissible for
Congress to condition the applicability of § 772(1) on whether or not
the particular theatrical production tended to discredit the Armed
Forces?92
As to the first question, the Court addressed the issue in just a sin-
gle sentence and concluded only that "previous cases would seem to
make it clear that 18 U.S.C. § 702, making it an offense to wear our
military uniforms without authority is, standing alone, a valid statute on
its face."93 To support this contention, the Court cited only United States
v. O'Brien, a 1968 case in which the U.S. Supreme Court established a
four-part test for evaluating whether government regulation of expres-
sive conduct is permissible despite First Amendment constraints."
85 Id. at 59 n.2, 60.
99 Id. at 60-61.
87 Id.
99 Id. at 59.
89 Sec Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61-62.
9° See id, at 61.
91 See id,
92 See id. at 62.
98 Id. at 61. Six justices joined in support of this line of reasoning and conclusion. See
id. at 61, 65. Three justices implicitly endorsed an identical outcome to this question but
did not describe the reasoning that supported their conclusion. See id. at 69 (White, J.,
concurring in the result).
94 Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61; see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)
("However, even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's
conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow
that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity."). For
more on the test established by O'Brien and on the applicability of that test to the wearing
of military uniforms, see infra notes 182-200 and accompanying text.
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Faced with the question of whether Schacht was acting in a "theat-
rical production" within the meaning of § 772(f), the Court embraced
an inclusive interpretation of the phrase. 95
 First, relying on the com-
mon meaning and historical understanding of the term "theatrical
production," the Court stated that phrase must embrace outdoor per-
formances by amateurs, even if such a performance is not confined to a
traditional stage or accompanied by the trappings of a more formal
production.96 Second, the Court indicated that Congress specifically
altered the language of the statute in a recent revision in order "to
move to broader, more flexible language, which, for example, would
include television as well as other types of theatrical productions wher-
ever presented."97 Based on this inclusive interpretation of the term,
the Court concluded "emphatically" that the street skit in which
Schacht participated was a "theatrical production" within the meaning
of § 772(f) . 98
Finally; the Court examined whether the final clause of § 772(0,
which limited the applicability of the section only to those theatrical
productions that do not tend to discredit the armed forces, was an un-
constitutional restraint of free speech.99 The Court concluded that this
provision violated First Amendment protections because it expressly
linked criminal liability to speech contenl.'0° Consequently; the Court
struck this final clause from the statute and stated that "[t] he final
clause of § 772(0, which leaves Americans free to praise the war in
Vietnam but can send persons like Schacht to prison for opposing it,
cannot survive in a country which has the First Amendment." 101
Given that the Supreme Court has emphatically stated that street
skits invoke the protection of § 772(0 and that such protection may not
95 See Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61-62.
96 See id. at 61.
97 Id, at 62 n.3.
99 See id, at 61-62. Six justices embraced this interpretation and outcome. See id, at 61-
62, 65. Three justices proposed a similarly broad and malleable definition but suggested
that the application of the dentition should be left to the jury. See id. at 69-70 (white,,.,
concurring in the result) ('The critical question in deciding what is to count as a 'theatri-
cal production' ought to be whether or not, considering all the circumstances of the per-
formance, au ordinary observer would have thought he was seeing a fictitious portrayal
rather than a piece of reality."). •
99 See id. at 62-63.
0" See Schacht, 398 U.S. at 62-63.
10 See id. at 63. The three justices who did not join this portion of the opinion never-
theless explicitly agreed that the final clause of § 772(f) was unconstitutional. See id. at 69
(White, J., concurring in the result) ("I agree that Congress cannot constitutionally distin-
guish between those theatrical performances that do and those that do not 'tend to dis-
credit' the military, in authorizing persons not on active duty to wear a uniform.").
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be limited based on the content of the performance, it appears likely
that a person with no military affiliation who wore a military uniform
while participating in a guerrilla theater performance identical to that
in which Kokesh participated could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 702. 102 Consequently, under current military policy, 1RR members
like Kokesh may be and have been punished by administrative separa-
tion for engaging in conduct that would be entirely lawful if performed
by a person lacking military affiliation.'" This disparity demonstrates
that IRR members have been subjected to an additional restraint on
their uniform-related expression and conduct.'" Two questions re-
main: (1) By what standard should a court evaluate the constitutionality
of this additional restraint; and (2) at what outcome should a court ar-
rive when applying the appropriate standard?"5
11. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
This Part describes three First Amendment standards which may
be applicable to evaluating the constitutionality of placing additional
restrictions on the wearing of military uniforms by IRR members acting
M theatrical productions. 106 First, the First Amendment permits the
government to place additional restrictions on the speech of its own
employees in some circumstances. 107 Second, a First Amendment stan-
dard might be derived from the judicial branch's historical pattern of
deference to decisions by Congress and the executive about the rights
and responsibilities of servicemembers. 08 Third, the First Amendment
does not necessarily protect expression by conduct, such as the wearing
of particular clothing.'"
A. Government Employee
In 1968, in Pickering v. Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the First Amendment protects, to a limited degree, a govern-
ment employee's right to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public
102 Sec id. at 61-63.
103 See id.; see also supra notes 36-77 and accompanying text.
too
	 Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61-63; see also supra notes 36-77 and accompanying text.
1 °5 See, e.g., O'Btierz, 391 U.S. at 377.
106 See infra notes 110-213 and accompanying text.
107 See infra notes 110-150 and accompanying text.
108 See infra notes 151-181 and accompanying text.
199 Sec infra notes 182-213 and accompanying text.
20081	 The First Amendment, Military Uniforms & the Ready Reserve
	 1147
concern.'" When a government employee alleges that the employee's
speech caused adverse treatment by a government employer in violation
of the First Amendment, the Court requires a two-step inquiry into
whether the government may restrict the employee's speech to a greater
degree than it may restrict the speech of a non-employee. 1 " This ap-
proach has been applied to both verbal speech and expressive con-
duct. 112
 This analysis may be applied to a variety of speech restrictions,
ranging from ad hoc disciplinary actions to broad statutory prohibi-
tions." 3
First, the Court determines if a First Amendment interest exists by
evaluating whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of pub-
lic concern. 114
 An employee does not speak as a citizen when the em-
ployee makes statements pursuant to his official duties." 5
 In general,
the Court determines whether an employee's speech addresses a mat-
ter of public concern based upon "the content, form, and context of a
given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”" 6
 The Court has
concluded that subjects such as the quality of the management of pub-
lic institutions, 117
 the failure to distribute important government in-
110 See 391 U.S. 563, 565, 568 (1968); see also Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417
(2006).
In See Garvin, 597 U.S. at 418.
,ts Sec id. at 920; City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78, 79, 84 (2004) (applying
Pickering analysis to dismissal of a police officer who sold videos depicting himself engaging
in sex acts while wearing a police uniform and performing police duties, and concluding
that the police officer's expression did not reach a matter of public concern, therefore
failing the first prong of the analysis); see also Locurto v. Giuliani, 497 F.3d 159, 164-65, 172
(2d Cir. 2006) (applying Pickering analysis to dismissal of police officers who made racially
insensitive statements and engaged in racially insensitive behavior while riding on a parade
float).
113
 See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466-67 (1995)
(citing Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 ( 1 973)).
114
	 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
1115 See id. at 421 (concluding that a prosecutor's advice to a supervisor regarding how
to proceed with a case was a statement pursuant to the prosecutor's official duties). Al-
though declining to articulate a test for determining the scope of an employee's official
duties for First Amendment purposes, the Court in Garcetti indicated that the inquiry must
be "a practical one" and that employers could not expand their control over employee
communications simply by writing "excessively broad job descriptions." U. at 424. At least
one commentator has argued that this "statements pursuant to official duties" exception
may preclude First Amendment protection for employees who speak at all when their offi-
cial duty is to remain silent. See generally Jamie Sasser, Comment, Silenced Citizens: The Post-
Garcetti Landscape for Public Sector Employees Working in National Security, 41 U. RICH, L. REV.
759 (2007).
118
 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
11v
	 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282, 289 (1977);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
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formation to citizens, 116 and political intrusion into apolitical govern-
ment functionsu9
 are matters of public concern. Topics such as routine
personnel matters, 129 a subordinate's personal confidence in the char-
acter of a supervisor, 121 and the quality of communication within a pub-
lic institution generally are not. 122
Second, if a First Amendment interest exists, the Court evaluates
the extent to which the infringement of the First Amendment interest
was justified by balancing the "interests of the [employee], as a citi-
zen, in commenting upon matters of public concern [against] the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees." 123 Factors that
weigh in favor of the employee include determinations that the em-
ployee was the person most likely to have informed and definite opin-
ions about "a question [for which] free and open debate is vital to in-
formed decision-making by the electorate," 124 and that the employee's
action violated no established policy. 126 Factors that weigh in favor of
the government include observations that the speech undermined
the authority of superiors, 126 disrupted harmony among coworkers, 127
created a false impression in the mind of the public that was difficult
to counter, 128 and caused other detrimental impacts to the function of
the organization. 129 When the justification of the employer in limiting
the employee's opportunities to contribute to public debate is not
significantly greater than the employer's interest in limiting a similar
contribution by any member of the general public, the regulation of
116 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
116 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.
126 See id. at 148-49,155.
121 See id.
122 See id.
125 See Garcent, 547 U.S. at 418; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
124 Sec Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72.
126 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 153; Doyle, 429 U.S. at 284.
126 See Con nick, 461 U.S. at 151-52; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570. The fact that a communi-
cation was made privately to a supervisor rather than publicly is not determinative, al-
though the content of such a communication, as well as the time, place, and manner of
the communication, may inform a court's evaluation of the effect on institutional effi-
ciency. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410,415 & n.4 (1979); see also
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420-21 ("Many citizens do much of their talking inside their respective
workplaces, and it would not serve the goal of treating public employees like any member
of the general public to hold that all speech within the office is automatically exposed to
restriction." (citations and internal quotations omitted)); Con nick, 461 U.S. at 152-53.
127 See Con nick, 461 U.S. at 151-52; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570.
126 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
199 See id. at 571.
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the employee's speech must then be evaluated according to the rele-
vant First Amendment standard for non-empIoyees, 130
For the purposes of this doctrine, "employee" has been defined
not by formal concepts of agency or employment law but rather by
the existence of a reciprocal relationship in which the government
provides a benefit and extracts a service.' 31
 The Court has stated that
any extra power that the government possesses to regulate employee
speech more strictly than non-employee speech exists because
"[w] hen someone who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to an
agency's effective operation begins to do or say things that detract
from the agency's effective operation, the government employer must
have some power to restrain her." 32 In 1996, in Board of County Com-
missione► s v. Umbehr; the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether
Pickering's First Amendment balancing test for employees might ex-
tend to an independent contractor.'" After concluding that the tradi-
tional distinction between contracts for employment and contracts for
services was "at best a very poor proxy for the interests at stake," the
Court chose to evaluate the applicability of the doctrine by examining
the degree to which the plaintiff possessed a "close relationship" to
the government. 134 The Court devised a spectrum of relationships,
drawn from Pickering and from other precedents, that spanned
from government employees, whose close relationship with
the government requires a balancing of important free speech
and government interests, to claimants for tax exemptions, us-
ers of public facilities, and recipients of small government sub-
sidies, who are much less dependent on the government but
more like ordinary citizens whose viewpoints on matters of
public concern the government has no legitimate interest in
repressing.'"
130 See id. at 572-74. For example, the Court in Pickering concluded that, based on the
nature of the speech at issue, the relevant First Amendment standard for non-employees
was the requirement that the plaintiff prove knowing or reckless falsity established by Nero
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.
131 See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,678-80 (1996).
132 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,674-75 (1994).
133 See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674.
134 See id. at 678-80.
135 See id. at 680 (citations omitted); see also Patrick j. Cammarata, Applying First Amend-
' ment Principles to Shield Independent Government Contractors from Retaliatory Dismissal; Board of
County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 38 B.C. L. REV. 422,429-30 (1997).
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Consequently, because independent contractors, who act as surro-
gates for government agencies and who receive "a valuable financial
benefit," lie at an intermediate point on this spectrum of relation-
ships, they are entitled only to the limited First Amendment protec-
tions established by Pickering. 136
At least two courts have adopted the Pickering test in cases involv-
ing military servicemembers. 137 In 1995, in Lee v. United Slates, the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims considered a case in which James Lee, a re-
serve officer on paid active duty with the Air Force, was required by
regulations to inform his superiors of any conditions which could in-
terfere with his duties as a nuclear missile launch control officer. 138
Lee told his superior officers that he had moral reservations about
the use of nuclear weapons and was not sure that he could follow an
order to launch a nuclear missile. 139 Lee was subsequently subjected
to administrative action, including reassignment and then honorable
discharge from the service. 140 In a suit for back pay and reinstatement,
Lee charged that his discharge violated, among other things, his First
Amendment rights. 141 Applying the first prong of the Pickering test, the
court concluded that no violation of the First Amendment had oc-
curred because Lee's own inability to launch nuclear weapons was not
a matter of public concern. 142 Additionally; the court reasoned that,
even if a matter of public concern had been raised and the analysis
1 S6 See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674, 680-81. The Court has also recently applied the
Pickering test to the regulation of recruiting activity by private schools that have voluntarily
joined state athletic associations. See Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v, Brentwood
Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2495-96 (2007). In 2007, in Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'', u
Brentwood Academy, the Court did not precisely articulate why the contractual relationship
between the school and the athletic association was sufficiently similar to an employment
relationship to invoke the Pickering test, although the Court did appear to emphasize the
voluntariness of membership in the athletic association and the fact that members benefit
substantially from the common agreement to abide by certain restrictions. See id. Reflect-
ing on this imprecise fit between the facts and the doctrine, justice Thomas stated that "no
First Amendment framework readily applies to this case" and referred to the application of
the Pickering test as "the bizarre exercise of extending obviously inapplicable First Amend-
ment doctrine." Id. at 2499 (Thomas, j., concurring in the judgment).
"7 Carr, supra note 54, at 364.
I315 See 32 Fed, CI. 530, 534 (1995).
139 jd, at 534-35.
140 Id. at 535-36.
14 t Id. at 534, 536.
142 Id. at 543. In the aftermath of Garcetti, it appears that the court could have also
concluded that the first prong was not satisfied because Lee was required to make his state-
ments by regulations, was therefore making a statement pursuant to his official duties, and
consequently was not speaking as a citizen. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421; Lee, 32 Fed. Cl. at
543.
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proceeded to the second prong, application of the balancing test
would demonstrate that the Air Force's "compelling need to ensure
that all members will carry out all lawful orders" outweighed Lee's
speech interest."3
In 1989 in Banks v. Ball, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia evaluated a case in which Richard Banks, a reserve offi-
cer apparently on paid active duty with the Navy, wrote letters to Con-
gress in order to complain that his unit was unlikely to receive new
equipment on schedule.'" He wrote the letters on his official letter-
head, included in them his office telephone number, and made refer-
ences to his status as the commanding officer of his unit. 145 Regulations
prohibited naval personnel from acting in their official capacity when
contacting members of Congress."6
 Banks's superior officer subse-
quently initiated an administrative action that resulted in Banks's reas-
signment to a nonpaying billet in a voluntary training unit."7 In evalu-
ating Banks's claim that the administrative action violated his First
Amendment rights, the court first concluded that the delay of deliver-
ies of military equipment was a matter of public concern. 143 Continu-
ing, the court applied the balancing test and determined that the mili-
tary interest in uniformity and discipline outweighed Banks's interest in
communicating in his official capacity, particularly given the fact that
Banks could have communicated effectively in ways that did not violate
the regulation, including by writing as a private citizen and by circulat-
ing his letter through the chain of command. 149 Consequently, the mili-
tary was justified in imposing additional restrictions on the service-
member's speech. 150
B. Military Deference
Cases involving inquiries into the constitutionality of military
conduct generally fall into one or more of three categories.'" First, a
case may require an examination of "the vertical reach of the Bill of
Rights within the military"—the extent to which the Constitution lim-
143 Lee, 32 Fed. CI. at 543.
144 See 705 F. Supp. 282,282-84 (E.D. Va. 1989).
145 Id. at 284.
146 Id. at 285.
147
 Id. at 284.
Ins Id. at 287.
145 Banks, 705 F. Supp. at 287-88.
15° Id. at 288.
151 See 'Warren, supra note 60, at 186.
1152	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 49:1131
its the exercise of military authority over persons properly tinder mili-
tary contro1. 152 Second, a case may require inquiry into "the horizon-
tal reach of the Bill of Rights," a question of whether the rights of a
particular type of person may be restricted by military authority at
al1. 153 Third, a case may require evaluation of actions taken by a non-
military government actor for the purpose of advancing a military
interest)" This third category of case is not relevant to the current
inquiry, as the military itself has asserted the authority to regulate the
expression of IRR members.' 55
hi "horizontal" cases, which require an inquiry into whether the
person, property, or object is a proper subject of regulation premised
upon the exercise of military authority, the Court has accepted the
proposition that even a relatively attenuated connection to military
matters is sufficient to justify such a regulation.' 56 Although several re-
cent decisions have limited the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction
over persons not on active duty, 157 the Court has generally acknowl-
edged that Congress's military authority justifies the regulation by stat-
ute of such essentially civilian activities as selective service functions, 158
law school recruitment practices, 159 and the wearing of military uni-
152 See id.
168 See id.
154 See id. Although this note will not further investigate this third category of military
cases, examples offered by Chief Justice Warren include Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and United Steelworkers of America v. United States,
391 U.S. 39 (1959). Sec Warren, supra note 60, at 198-99.
155 See supra notes 9-77 and accompanying text.
156 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943); Ex parte Quinn, 317 U.S. 1, 46 (1942). But see Duncan v. Ka-
hanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121-22 (1866).
187 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23 (1957) (rejecting court-martial jurisdiction over
servicemember's civilian dependent living on a military base located in foreign territory);
United States ex rel. Toth V. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22-23 (1955) (rejecting court-martial
jurisdiction over discharged servicemember). Although later overruled by Solotio v. United
States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987), the Court's decision in O'Callahau v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,
272-74 (1969), for a time prohibited the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over ser-
vicemembers whose alleged crimes were not connected to their activities in the service.
158 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1968) (indicating that Congress
possesses the constitutional authority under its military powers to require civilians to both
register for a military draft and retain certificates of eligibility); see also Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (endorsing the notion that Congress's military powers include
the authority to select which categories of people shall be subjected to selective service
registration requirements).
159 See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 59-60
(2006) (stating that Congress has the constitutional authority under its military powers to
compel law schools to grant access to military recruiters).
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forms by persons with no military affiliation. 160
 Consequently, the regu-
lation of the wearing of military uniforms by IRR members is likely
within the military power of Congress and therefore presents no "hori-
zontal" question. 161
In "vertical" cases, which consider the degree to which the Con-
stitution restrains government regulation of persons, property, or ob-
jects properly under military control, the Supreme Court has, since
the 1970s, applied what is frequently termed the "Military Deference
Doctrine." 162 The doctrine recognizes that, although the subjects of
military control have constitutional rights, the degree to which courts
may intervene to protect those rights is more limited than the protec-
tion afforded to comparable rights of a person under purely civil au-
thority.' 63 The Court has suggested three justifications for this propo-
sition.'" First, the Constitution grants Congress and the executive the
authority to govern the military and is silent on the role of the judici-
ary in this regard. 165 By implication, the judiciary's constitutional au-
thority to review Congress's judgments regarding military matters is
somewhat limited. 166 Second, military judgments necessarily require
164 See Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 61 (1970) (indicating that Congress possesses
the constitutional authority to regulate the wearing of military uniforms by civilians).
10 Sec id.
162 Seefohn F. O'Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35
GA. L. Rev. 161, 307-08 (2000).
162
	
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (concluding that active duty
military personnel enjoy First Amendment guarantees to a lesser extent than civilians),
superseded by statute, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989,
§ 508, Pub. L. No. 100-180, 101 Stat. 1019, 1086-87 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2006);
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974) ("While
members of the military community enjoy many of the same rights and bear many of the
same burdens as do members of the civilian community, within the military community
there is simply not the same autonomy as there is hi the larger civilian community.");
O'Connor, supra note 162, at 232-33.
164
	 Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 38, 43-44 (1976); O'Connor, supra note 162,
at 259; see also John N. Ohlweiler, Note, The Principle of Deference: Facial Constitutional Chal-
lenges to Military Regulations, 10 J.L. 8: Poi. 147, 152-53 (1993).
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power to declare war, to raise and
support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces); U.S. CoNsT. art. § 2 (designating the President
as the commander in chief of the army and navy); see U.S. CoNs-r. art. III (omitting specific
mention of the relationship between the judiciary and the military); see also Keith M. Har-
rison, Be All You Can Be (Without the Protection of the Constitution), S HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J.
221,223-24 (1991).
166 See Solorio, 983 U.S. at 447-98 ("Congress has primary responsibility for the delicate
task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the military."); Goldman,
475 U.S. at 508 ("' [I] udicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative action under the
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for
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expertise that may be lacking in the judiciary. 167 Consequently, pru-
dential concerns counsel that this lack of judicial competence justifies
more limited intervention in military affairs. 168 Third, the military is a
specialized society that cannot properly function without uncommon
devotion to obedience, discipline, and conformity, 169
 These needs are
inconsistent with the constitutional protections typically available to
civilians, and, therefore, some lesSer degree of protection is necessary
to permit the military to effectively advance national in terests. 17°
Despite these concerns, the Court will provide some substantive
review of alleged violations of the constitutional rights of a person who
is properly the subject of military authority. 171 The Court will also apply
at least one of three techniques in order to reduce the scope of those
rights and promote deference to the political branches' authority over
military matters. 172 First, the Court. may apply a more lenient standard
of review to the constitutional claim. 173 Second, if the proper standard
their governance is challenged.'" (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70)); Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) ("It is clear that the Constitution contemplated that the Legisla-
tive Branch have plenary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework
of the Military Establishment ... and Congress and the courts have acted in conformity
with that view."); Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 43 ("In making such an analysis we must give par-
ticular deference to the determination of Congress, made under its authority to regulate
the land and naval forces that counsel should not be provided in summary courts-martial."
(citation omitted)); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) (rejecting a challenge
to sex-based features of the military promotion system on the grounds that, in setting up
the system. Congress had exercised its "broad constitutional power" to "determine how
best our Armed Forces shall attend to [military] business.").
167 Sec Solorio, 483 U.S. at 448 ("The notion that civil courts are ill equipped to establish
policies regarding matters of military concern is substantiated by experience ...." (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Chappell. 462 U.S. at 302 (stating in reference to military
matters that "'it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the
courts have less competence'" (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973))); Rost-
ker, 453 U.S. at 65-66.
' 68 See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507-08; Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 44.
' 69 See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507 ("[T] o accomplish its mission the military must foster
instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps."); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300
("[N]o military organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that
would be unacceptable in a civilian setting.").
Em See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300 ("Civilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long
before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established relationship
between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers; that relationship is at the
heart of the necessarily unique structure of the Military Establishment.").
'" See O'Connor, supra note 162, at 282.
"2 See id.
175 See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (declining to apply civilian due
process standards to military context); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (declining
to apply the public forum doctrine to the suppression of political speech on a portion of a
military installation open to the public); _Parker, 417 U.S. at 756 ("Because of the factors
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of review involves a balancing test, the Court may amplify the magni-
tude of the government's interest in regulating conduct." 4
 Third, the
Court may limit the availability of various causes of action to service-
members. 1 ^5
 The application of such techniques results in heightened
judicial deference to the government's assessment of the magnitude of
its own interest in regulating military activity."6
The Court has applied the Military Deference Doctrine to at least
one case involving the wearing of military uniforms. 177
 In 1986, in Gold-
man v. Weinberger; the U.S. Supreme Court considered a claim by an ac-
tive duty officer in the Air Force that regulations restricting the wearing
of religious items while in uniform infringed on his First Amendment
right to the free exercise of his religion. 178
 Stating that "courts must
differentiating military society from civilian society, we hold that the proper standard of
review for a vagueness challenge to the (UC141) is the standard which applies to criminal
statutes regulating economic affairs.").
174
 See, e.g., Rostker, 453 U.S. at 69-72 (applying civilian gender-based discrimination
due process standard with heightened attention to Congress's assessment of government
in terest).
175 See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 692 (1987) (denying active duty service-
member cause of action under Federal Tort Claims Act where defendants were members of
nonmilitary government agency); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985) (deny-
ing serlicemembers cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act where defendants
were superiors in chain of command); Chappell 462 U.S. at 304 (denying givens-type cause of
action to enlisted military personnel in suits against superior officers); see also United States v.
Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987) (stating that the Chappelldoctrine applies to all suits arising
out of activity incident to military service); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritar-
ian Institutions, 32 Sumnit U. 1. REV. 441, 443 (1999); O'Connor, supra note 162, at 282
(stating that denying causes of action to servicemembers contributes to judicial deference to
the military by pushing "the resolution of disputes between senicemembers and their supe-
riors" out of "the courts and to the political branches").
176 See O'Connor, supra note 162, at 261. Many circuits, prior to reviewing the merits of
a claim, will also apply a justiciability test that takes into account exhaustion of military
remedies, type of harm, nature and strength of the servicemember's claim, potential in-
jury if review is denied, type and degree of interference with military function, and the
extent of military expertise or discretion involved in the challenged decision. See E. Roy
Hawkins, The Exhaustion Component of theNtindes Justiciability Test Is Not Laid to Rest by Darby
v. Cisneros, 166 MIL. L. Rvv. 67, 69-73 (2000) (discussing prevalence of justiciability test
announced by Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971)); Gabriel W. Goenstein,
Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the Military, 84 COMO. L. REV. 387,
397-403 (1984).
177 See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507-10; see also Rhalsa v. Weinberger, 787 F.2d 1288, 1289-
90 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Stone, 37 Mj. 558, 561-564 (A.C.M.R. 1993) (applying
Military Deference Doctrine in concluding that active duty servicemember who made false
and disturbing claims about his conduct in Operation Desert Shield while on leave and
speaking in uniform to high school assembly could constitutionally be punished but that
any punishment for unflattering but substantially truthful speech might be prohibited by
the First Amendment).
178
 See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 505-06.
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give great deference to the professional judgment of military authori-
ties concerning the relative importance of a particular military inter-
est," the Court then accepted that the military's "considered profes-
sional judgment is that the traditional outfitting of personnel in
standardized uniforms encourages the subordination of personal pref-
erences and identities in favor of the overall group mission."'" Conse-
quently, the Court concluded that "the regulations challenged here
reasonably and evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of the mili-
tary's perceived need for uniformity" and were therefore permissible.' 8°
Although the Court did not precisely articulate its standard of review, it
did note, without overt disapproval, the appellate court's conclusion
that, rather than applying a strict scrutiny or rational basis standard, a
court should permit the military to restrict First Amendment rights
when the government pursues legitimate military ends and the regula-
tion is designed to accommodate the individual right to an appropriate
degree. 1131
C. Expressive Conduct
In 19G8, in United States v. O'Brien, the U.S. Supreme Court consid-
ered whether government regulation banning conduct could violate
the First Atnendment. 182 The specific regulation in question in O'Brien
179 See id. at 507-08.
18° See id. at 510.
18 ' See id. at 506. Justice Brennan, in a vigorous dissent, argued that the majority was
applying "a subrational-basis standard" that credited the military's assertion of necessity
"no matter how absurd or unsupported it may be." See id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
see also Khalsa, 787 F.2d at 1289-90 (noting similarity between Goldman standard of review
and "the doctrine of limited reviewability of military regulations as followed in this cir-
cuit"); Adair v. England, 183 F. Stipp. 2d 31, 52 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting that Goldman pro-
vides "little clear guidance" regarding the appropriate standard of review); Barney F.
Bilello, Note, Judicial Review and Soldiers' Rights: Is the Piinciple of Deference a Standard of Re-
view?, 17 HOES'ERA L. Rxv. 465, 491 (1989) (suggesting that Goldman "fails to provide any
intelligible guidance beyond the confines of the particular facts of the case for resolving
constitutional claims of members of the armed forces"); Linda Sugin, Note, First Amend-
ment Rights of Military Personnel: Denying Rights to Those Who Defend Them, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
855, 872 (1987) (suggesting that the Court in Goldman "implied that any decision of the
military, as long as the military authorities labeled it necessary for some military need,
would be illumine from judicial scrutiny"). Recognizing this confusion, in 2002 in Adair,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia declined to extend the Goldman stan-
dard to a case where the challenged policy did not advance a specific or important "opera-
tional, strategic, or tactical objective" and instead applied strict scrutiny to military policies
which allegedly skewed the promotion and retention of chaplains based on religious de-
nomination. See 183 F. Supp. 2d at 35, 50-53, 55. But see Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp.
2d 11, 29 (D.D.C. 2007), affd on other grounds, 525 F.3d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
182 See 391 U.S. at 376-77.
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was a statute that imposed criminal penalties on the destruction or mu-
tilation of a draft card. 183
 David Paul O'Brien burned his draft card on
the steps of a courthouse in order to "influence others to adopt his an-
tiwar beliefs" and was subsequently indicted and convicted. 18.1
The Court in O'Brien reached four important conclusions. 185
 First,
while rejecting the idea "that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea," the Court accepted the proposition
that the communicative element of certain conduct could be sufficient
to invoke First Amendment protections.' The Court assumed (with-
out deciding) that O'Brien's expressive conduct included a sufficiently
"communicative element" to implicate First Amendment protections. 187
Second, the Court concluded "that when 'speech' and 'non-
speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a suffi-
ciently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment free-
doms."188
 The Court announced a four-part test to be applied when
evaluating this interest:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial government interest; if the govern-
mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amend-
ment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest. 189
183 See id. at 370.
184 See id. at 369-70.
185 See id. at 376-86.
188 See id. at 376.
187
 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. The Supreme Court later clarified the limits of expressive
conduct by stating that deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient com-
municative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether '[a]it
intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.'" See Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
188
 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. Where the asserted government interest is the suppression
of free expression, the O'Brien test is inapplicable. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407 ("In order to
decide whether O'Brien's test applies here, therefore, we must decide whether Texas has
asserted an interest in support ofJohnson's conviction that is unrelated to the suppression
of expression.").
leo See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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Third, the Court concluded that the statute prohibiting the de-
struction or mutilation of draft cards satisfied this four-part test.'" As
for part one, the Constitution grants Congress "broad and sweeping"
authority to make laws necessary and proper to raise and support ar-
mies. 19 ' Evaluating part two, the Court concluded that requiring regis-
trants to retain intact draft cards served a legitimate and substantial
government interest in efficiently operating the draft system because
the issuance and possession of unaltered draft cards minimizes future
administrative burdens on the Selective Service system, ensures that
registrants have access to important information such as their draft
number and the address of their local draft board, reminds the regis-
trant to make mandatory communications to their draft board, and
protects against the use of altered or forged draft cards. 192 Assessing
part three, the Court found that the government interest was unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression because "both the gov-
ernment interest and the operation of ]the statute] are limited to the
noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct."'" Lastly, with re-
gard to part four, the Court "perceive [d] no alternative means that
19° See id. at 382.
191 See id. at 377. Where a military uniform regulation prohibits conduct authorized by
Congress, the regulation is likely outside the constitutional power of the military. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005)
(recognizing implicitly Congress's power to create rights related to the wearing of military
uniforms); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301 (referring to Congress's power to regulate rights and
duties within the military establishment as "plenary"); In re Hodge, 220 B.R. 386, 397 (D.
Idaho 1998) (endorsing. in commentary on the aftermath of Goldman. Congress's power
to create a statutory right that supersedes restrictions imposed by military uniform regula-
tions); Alameen v. Coughlin, 892 F. Supp. 440, 450 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (recognizing that
a statute effectively overruled the outcome of Goldman); cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 593 & n.23 (2006) ("Whether or not the President has independent power, absent
congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard limi-
tations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers."
(citing Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring))); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (swing that, in an administrative
law context, "the [C]ourt, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress"); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804)
(declaring unlawful a military order authorizing captures on the high seas because the
order exceeded authority granted by Congress). But see David J. Barron & Martin S. Led-
erman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original
Understanding, 121 HAuv. L. REV. 689, 766 (2008) (concluding that, although the Court has
accepted the proposition that Congress may restrict executive military activity, the Court
has not ruled out the possibility that the executive retains some inherent and inviolable
military authority).
192 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 378-80.
"3 See id. at 381-82.
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would more precisely and narrowly assure" the fulfillment of the gov-
ernmen t's objective)"
Fourth, and finally, the Court stated that indications that the
purpose of a regulation is the suppression of free expression may be
drawn from the text or application of the regulation but generally
may not be implied from elements of legislative history) 95
The O'Brien test has been applied in civilian cases contesting regula-
tions that required or forbade the wearing of uniforms or other clothing
by public employees, 196 members of the general public, 197
 public school
students, 08
 exotic dancers, 199
 and Ku Klux Klan members.200 The
O'Brien test has also been applied to the military context on at least one
occasion. 201 In 1991, in United States v. Wilson, the U.S. Army Court of
Military Review considered whether the First Amendment prohibited
the punishment of an active duty soldier who blew his nose on the
194 See id. at 381.
195
	 id. at 382-86.
196 See Local 491, Intl Bhd. of Police Officers v. Gwinnett County, 510 F. Stipp. 2d 1271,
1281-82 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (utilizing O'Brien analysis to justify reduced scrutiny when reviewing
a police policy prohibiting the wearing of uniforms by off duty officers at public meetings).
But see Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, NA:, 316 F.3d 314, 319-20 (2d Cir. 2003) (declining to
apply O'Brien analysis to a county transportation department's dress code because the act of
wearing a skirt instead of pants was not sufficiently expressive to invoke First Amendment
protections due to the lack of a particularized and comprehensible message).
197
 See Suit e. State, 906 So. 2d 1013, 1025-31 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., dissenting) (ap-
plying O'Brien analysis to a state statute that prohibited the unauthorized wearing of law
enforcement uniforms); State v. McLamb, 932 P.2d 266, 272-74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (ap-
plying O'Brien analysis to an ordinance banning the unauthorized use of police insignia on
clothing).
198 See Blatt v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 391-93 (6th Cir. 2005) (apply.
ing O'Brien analysis to school dress code); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d
275, 285-87 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying O'Brien analysis to regulation requiring the manda-
tory wearing of school uniforms); Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 443 (5th
Cir. 2001); Lowry v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 508 F. Supp. 2d 713, 719 (E.D. Ark. 2007);
Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1185 (D. Nev. 2005).
199 See City of Erie v. Pap's AM., 529 U.S. 277, 296-302 (2000) (applying O'Brien analy-
sis to a public nudity ban that effectively required exotic dancers to wear pasties and a G-
string); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991); McCrothers Corp. v. City of
Mandan, 728 N.W.2d 124, 135 (N.D. 2007).
200 See State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 550-51 (Ga. 1990) (applying O'Brien analysis to stat-
ute banning the wearing of masks); Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 406 S.E.2d 398, 400-01
(Va. Ct. App. 1991). But see Church of Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197,
206-08 (2d Cir. 2004) (declining to apply O'Brien analysis to statute banning the wearing of
masks because, in the case of Klan members, the mask is optional, is redundant, "adds no
expressive force to the message portrayed by the rest of the outfit," and is therefore not ex-
pressive conduct); Hernandez v. Superintendent, Fredericksburg-Rappahonnock Joint Sec.
Ctr., 800 F. Supp. 1344, 1351 (E.D. Va. 1992).
201 See Carr, supra note 54, at 332.
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American flag during a flag-raising detail in order to express dissatisfac-
tion with military life. 242 The soldier had been convicted of disobeying a
lawful order and dereliction of duty in violation of UCMJ Article 92. 2°3
The court in this case addressed several related questiOns. 204 First, did
the accused engage in expressive conduct?205 Second, do members of
the military enjoy First Amendment protection of expressive conduct? 2°6
Third, if so, by what standard should that protection be evaluated?207
Fourth, how should this standard be applied to the facts of this case? 208
In answering the first question, the court adopted the finding of
the trial judge that "the accused's statements and his conduct in blow-
ing his nose on the flag when viewed together are expressive con-
d t."209
As to the second question, the court stated,
Members of the armed forces enjoy the First Amendment's
protections of freedom of speech. This includes not only the
right to verbally express ideas but also to utilize non-verbal
means of communication. However, members of the armed
forces may be subject to restraints on the exercise of their
freedom of speech not faced by civilians. This is so because
the needs of the armed forces may warrant regulation of con-
duct that would not be justified in the civilian communi ty 210
With respect to the third question, the court concluded that,
where expressive conduct is incidentally regulated, the four-part
O'Brien test must be applied. 2n
2°2 See 33 M.J. 797, 798 (A.C.M.R. 1991). The soldier stated that the Army and the
United States "sucked," then said "' [t] his is what I think,' and blew his nose on the Ameri-
can flag, leaving on the flag 'a small wet circle,'" Id.
"3 Id. at 797-98.
29 ' Id. at 798-800.
202 Id. at 799.
"6 See id. at 798-99.
297 Wilson, 33 M.J. at 799.
208 Id. at 800.
2°8 Id. at 798-800. The appellate court also adopted the trial court's conclusion that
Texas u Johnson was inapplicable because the regulation in question was designed to govern
the performance of military duties and therefore only incidentally restricted interests pro-
tected by the First Amendment. See id. at 798, 800.
210 Id. at 799 (citing United States v. Womack, 29 M.J. 88 (C.M.A. 1989)). The proposi-
tion that First Amendment rights of servicemembers are limited due to unusually strong
government interests is well suited to the O'Brien test, which explicitly accounts for such
government interest. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
2" See Wilson, 33 M.J. at 799.
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To address the fourth question, the court methodically applied
the elements of the O'Brien test in order to arrive at the proper out-
come and stated that: (1) Article 92 of the UCMJ is a legitimate exer-
cise of government authority because the government is empowered
to regulate the conduct of soldiers who are on duty and in uniform;
(2) Article 92 promotes an effective military force and therefore ad-
vances a substantial government interest; (3) the purpose served by
Article 92 is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4)
Article 92's incidental restriction of free speech is no greater than
necessary.212 Consequently, the court held that each component of
the four-part test was satisfied and that Article 92 therefore did not
unconstitutionally restrict the defendant's expressive conduct, 213
III. SELECTING AND APPLYING A STANDARD
As explained in Part I, the government has placed additional re-
strictions on the uniform-related expression of Individual Ready Re-
serve ("IRR") members. 214 Although a person with no military affilia-
tion may wear a military uniform while participating in a guerrilla
theater performance without fear of penalty, IRR members who en-
gage in identical conduct may be subject to involuntary administrative
separation, an act which may reduce access to veterans' benefits and
stigmatize the individual. 215 As discussed in Part II, this additional re-
striction on uniform-related expression might be evaluated under any
of three distinct standards in order to investigate conformity with First
Amendment restrictions on government regulation. 216 Of the three
available standards, the expressive conduct standard established by
the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien is most appropriate
to this problem.217
A. Application of the Government Employee Standard Is bapprop ► iate or Futile
Two considerations suggest that the application of the Pickering test
to evaluate the constitutionality of these restrictions on IRR members
212 Id. at 800.
212 Id.
214 See supra notes 35-105 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 35-105 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 110-213 and accompanying text.
217.See infra notes 270-290 and accompanying text.
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would be inappropriate or futile. 218 First, the Pickering test is applied to
restrictions on expression by government employees, and a member of
the IRR is not a government employee within the meaning of the
Picketing test.219 Second, the Pickering test, if applied, would simply re-
quire the application of some other appropriate test for evaluating re-
strictions on the speech of non-employees. 220
IRR members are not employees within the meaning of the
Pickering test because they possess an insufficiently close relationship
to the government. 22 ' In 1996, in Board of County Commissioners v. Um-
bek the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a formalistic definition of the
term "employee" for the purposes of deciding the applicability of the
Pickering test. 222 Instead, the Court concluded that relationships be:
tween individuals and the government fall upon a spectrum of close-
ness based on the individual's dependency on government assistance
and the legitimacy of the government's interest in controlling the in-
dividual's expression. 223 The relationship's position on this spectrum
of closeness determines whether the individual is an employee within
the meaning of the Pickering test. 224 Unless recalled to active duty, IRR
members live and work in the civilian community; perform no mili-
tary duties except occasional ministerial functions designed to ensure
readiness for recall, receive no salary or substantial employment
benefits from the military, and are not governed by the military jus-
tice system.226 Consequently; IRR members receive no valuable benefit
from the government and perform few, if any, government functions
that could justify a government interest in controlling expression.226
This lack of dependency and lack of employee-like functions strongly
suggest that IRR members do not have a close relationship with the
government. 227 Consequently, like users of public facilities or recipi-
ents of small government benefits, IRR members are not government
employees within the meaning of the Pickering test, and restrictions on
218 See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Urnbehr, 518 U.S. 668,680-81 (1996); Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,572-74 (1968).
219 See Unibehr, 518 U.S. at 680-81.
220 See Picketing, 391 U.S. at 572-74.
221 See Utnbehr, 518 U.S. at 680-81.
222 See id. al 678.
223 See id. at 680-81.
224 See id.
225 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
227 See Urnbehr, 518 U.S. at 680-81.
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expression by IRR members must be evaluated under some other
relevant standard. 228
Notably, the conclusion that IRR members are not employees
within the meaning of the Pickering test does not contradict the appli-
cation of the Pickering test to previous cases in which the military re-
stricted the expression of servicemembers. 2" In 1995, in Lee v. United
Stales and in 1989, in Banks v. Ball, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, respec-
tively, applied the Pickering test to speech-related disciplinary actions
against reserve officers. 238 In both cases, however, the officers made
the statements for which they were punished while performing offi-
cial government functions and apparently receiving pay from the gov-
ernment. 231 Because such factors heighten individual dependency on
government assistance and justify the government's interest in regu-
lating speech, the servicemembers in Lee and Banks possessed an in-
creased degree of closeness to the government that is generally absent
in cases involving IRR members, who perform few official functions
and generally receive no pay. 232 In light of this distinction, a determi-
nation that IRR members are not employees within the meaning of
Pickeringdoes not conflict with the holdings of Lee and Banks. 233
Additionally, even if the Pickering test were applied to instances in
which IRR members are disciplined for wearing uniform items during
guerrilla theater performances, such application would be futile be-
cause the outcome of the test would resolve nothing and would instead
direct the court to apply a relevant standard for non-employees. 234
When applying Pickering, a court must first inquire whether the em-
ployee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.236 It is likely
that IRR members performing guerrilla theater speak as citizens be-
cause such expression is not pursuant to any of their official duties. 236
The subject of a guerrilla theater performance, the conduct of an on-
2" See id.
226 See generally Lee v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 530 (1995); Banks v. Ball, 705 F. Supp.
282 (E.D. Va. 1989).
236 See Lee, 32 Fed. Cl. at 542; Banks, 705 F. Supp. at 286-87.
231 See Lee, 32 Fed. Cl. at 534, 536; Banks, 705 F. Supp. at 283-84.
232 See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 680-81; supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
233 See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 680-81; supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
234 Sec Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-74.
235 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,418 (2006).
236 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 10205(a), 10206(b) (2006); id. § 12319(a)-(b); cf Garcetti, 547 U.S.
at 421 (stating that employees are not speaking as citizens when they make statements
pursuant to their official duties).
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going military operation, is likely a matter of public concern because it
relates to the external functions and official conduct of a government
institution . 237
Since an IRR member participating in a guerrilla theater perform-
ance is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, a court
must then balance the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in com-
menting on matters of public concern against the interest of the gov-
ernment, as an employer, in providing efficient services. 238 Because IRR
members are likely to have recently served on active duty in any ongo-
ing conflict, they are people likely to possess informed and definite
opinions about a question, the conduct of the war, for which free and
open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate, a
fact which weighs in favor of the IRR members' ability to engage in
such expressive conduct. 239 More importantly, few, if any, factors weigh
in favor of the government's interest in regulating IRR members' ex-
pression. 24° Expression by IRR members cannot disrupt relationships
with coworkers or superiors because IRR members do not generally
perform any official duties and therefore have no contact with supervi-
sors or coworkers. 241 Additionally; IRR members are unlikely to convey
a false impression that is difficult to counter because the purpose of
guerrilla theater is to convey truth and because the military presumably
has access to ample information that could be communicated to the
public in order to counter falsi ty.242 Given this strong employee interest
and weak government interest, it appears likely that the government's
interest in limiting an IRR member's opportunities to contribute to
public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a
similar contribution by any citizen. 243 Consequently, the regulation of
the IRR member's expression must be evaluated by a relevant standard
237 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,282,284 (1977);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,594-95,598 (1972); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
238 Sec Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
239 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572 (stating that "Weachers are, as a class, the members of
a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions [about a matter of public
concern, and therefore] it is essential that they be able to speak out freely without fear
of retaliatory dismissal").
24° See id. at 569-70, 572; cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,151-52 (1983) (conclud-
ing that the need to protect "close working relationships [that] are essential to fulfilling
public responsibilities" is a factor that weighs in favor of the government's interest in pro-
viding efficient services).
2" See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70; cf. Cowlick, 961 U.S. at 151-52.
242 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572; HUNT, supra note 23, at 53.
2 ' 3 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70,572-73.
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for non-employees, a conclusion which demonstrates the futility of reli-
ance on the Pickering test in this context. 244
B. Application of the Military Deference Doctrine Is Unjustified
Furthermore, courts should not defer to the military's judgment
regarding the necessity of regulating the wearing of uniform items by
IRR members because application of the Military Deference Doctrine
to this circumstance would advance none of the three considerations
which traditionally justify such deference. 245 Application of the Mili-
tary Deference Doctrine would, in fact, frustrate, rather than advance,
the exercise of Congress's constitutional power to regulate the mili-
tary; it would not prevent the judiciary from intruding into matters in
which it has limited competence; and it would not prevent a disrup-
tion of the specialized military society. 246
First, application of the Military Deference Doctrine to restrictions
on the uniform-related expression of IRR members performing in
guerrilla theater events would not show respect for Congress's military
authority because, in this case, such deference would frustrate rather
than advance the will of Congress. 247 Congress, in 10 U.S.C. § 772, has
described situations in which the wearing of military uniforms by "per-
sons not on active duty" is authorized. 248 One such situation is when an
actor, a broadly inclusive terra which implies no presence or absence of
military affiliation, portrays a member of the military in a theatrical
production, a category which includes guerrilla theater. 249
 Therefore,
Congress has authorized a person not on active duty to wear a military
uniform while acting in guerrilla theater performances. 25° Because an
IRR member is not on active duty, Congress has authorized.IRR mem-
bers to wear a military uniform while participating in such perform-
ances. 251 Consequently, the imposition of adverse consequences, such
244 See id. at 572-74.
245 See supra notes 164-170 and accompanying text; cf. Stencel Aero Ettg'g Co, v.
United States, 431 U.S. 666,672-74 (1977) (deciding whether to extend the doctrine an-
nounced in Feres u. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), by examining whether the principles
underlying the doctrine were equally applicable to the new context and holding the doc-
trine should govern in the new context because "the factors considered by the Feres court
are largely applicable in this type of case as well"),
246 See supra notes 164-170 and accompanying text.
247 see, e.g., Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435,447-48 (1987).
246 10	 § 772 (2006).
249 See id. § 772(f); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58,61-62 (1970).
259 See l0 U.S.C. § 772; Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61-62.
251 See 10 U.S.C. § 10144.
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as administrative separation, on IRR members who wear military uni-
forms while participating in a guerrilla theater performance ignores
the will of Congress. 252 Application of the Military Deference Doctrine
to judicial review of such a separation would only serve to compound
this frustration of legislative authority. 253 Such a result is antithetical to
the first justification underlying the Military Deference Doctrine, re-
spect for the judgment and constitutional authority of the legislative
branch with respect to military functions. 254
Second, application of the Military Deference Doctrine to•restric-
tions on the uniform-related expression of IRR members performing in
guerrilla theater performances would not prevent the judiciary from
nmking judgments about matters in which it lacks competence, as a
nondeferential review of such a restriction would not require inquiry
into such matters. 255 The connection between IRR members and the
military is severely attenuated. 256 IRR members live and work as civil-
ians. 257 IRR members' military duties are limited to those few adminis-
trative functions which are necessary to ensure availability for recall to
active duty in a time of national need. 258 IRR members are not gov-
erned by the military justice system and do not receive pay or substan-
tial benefits from the military. 259 This limited connection between IRR
members and the military precludes the notion that judicial review of
the administrative separation of IRR members based on uniform-
related expression would require a court to establish policies related to
matters of military concern.260 Because review of such a separation
would not require a court to stray beyond the traditional boundaries of
judicial competence, the application of the Military Deference Doc-
trine to limit such review could hardly be said to prevent an imprudent
outcome. 261
Third, application of the Military Deference Doctrine in this con-
text would not prevent the disruption of the specialized military soci-
ety because a court evaluating the administrative separation of an IRR
252 See id. § 772; Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61-62.
255 See supra notes 172-176 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983).
255 Cf. Solorio, 483 U.S. at 448-49.
250 Seelklontgomery, supra note 50.
257 See id.
258 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 10205-10206; id. § 12319.
259 See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (1), (a) (3), (c), (d) (2); id. § 1074 (a) (2) (A)-(B); 37 U.S.C.
§ 204(a) (2) (2000); id. § 433(a)-(b).
26° Cf. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986).
26I Cf. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)).
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member under a nondeferential standard would not be required to
evaluate or dictate the characteristics of the specialized military sod-
ety. 262 The existence of a specialized military society in which constitu-
tional protections may be limited is justified by the fact that members
of that society perform military functions which cannot succeed with-
out instinctive obedience and strict conformity. 263
 For example, in
1986, in Goldman v. Weinberget; the U.S. Supreme Court applied the
Military Deference Doctrine to a challenge to uniform regulations
pertaining to an active duty servicemember, in part due to the mili-
tary's extraordinary need to foster obedience in order to accomplish'
military tasks. 264 Unlike the active duty officer in Goldman, however,
IRR members live as civilians within a civilian setting. 265 Unless re-
called to active duty, IRR members do not perform military activities
for which unusually strict discipline and immediate obedience may be
required.266 Consequently, the justifications underlying the recogni-
tion of a specialized military society do not extend to members of the
IRR, and IRR members must be considered members of the civilian
community for constitutional purposes. 267 Therefore, application of
the Military Deference Doctrine to the review of administrative sepa-
ration of IRR members would not protect the existence of a special-
ized military society', as a court reviewing the exercise of authority tin-
der a nondeferential standard would not be required to evaluate the
regulation of any member of the specialized military society. 268
Because the application of the Military Deference Doctrine in
this context would not prevent infringement on Congress's constitu-
tional authority, would not prevent the judiciary from making judg-
ments relating to matters in which it lacks competence, and would not
advance the interest of the specialized military society, it is not the
appropriate standard under which to review this exercise of govern-
ment authority. 269
264 q id. at 300.
263 See id.
24 See 475 U.S. at 507.
266 Sec Mon tgomery, supra note 50.
266 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 10205-10206; id. § 12319.
267 Cf. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507; Adair v. England, 183 F. Supp. 2d 31, 50-53 (D.D.C.
2002).
268 cf. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300.
269 See supra notes 164-170, 245-268 and accompanying text.
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C. Application of the Expressive Conduct Standard Is Appropriate
Three factors suggest that the expressive conduct standard an-
nounced by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1968 in United States v. O'B ►ien is
most appropriate to evaluate restrictions on the wearing of military uni-
forms by IRR members participating in guerrilla theater perform-
ances. 2" First, the wearing of military uniforms in a guerrilla theater
performance is conduct which includes a sufficiently expressive ele-
ment to implicate First Amendment protections. 271 Second, the wearing
of military uniforms includes a nonspeech element in which the gov-
ernment could assert an interest in regulating. 272 Third, the O'Brien
standard, through its deferential assessment of government interest,
properly accommodates the special concerns that may arise in disputes
between servicemembers and the military hierarchy. 275
The application of the O'Brien standard to restrictions on the wear-
ing of military uniforms during guerrilla theater performances is ap-
propriate because such conduct includes a sufficiently expressive ele-
ment to implicate First Amendment protections. 274 In 1970, in Schacht
v. United Slates, the U.S. Supreme Court cited only O'Brien as support for
the proposition that Congress may pass legislation generally prohibit-
ing the wearing of military uniforms. 275 This reliance suggests that the
wearing of military uniforms could be expressive conduct, and the
Court has since explicitly stated that Schacht stands for the proposition
that the wearing of military uniforms in a dramatic presentation criti-
cizing a war is expressive conduct. 276 Additionally, the O'Brien standard
has been applied to a variety of other contexts in which government
authority is exerted to require or limit the wearing of uniforms or other
clothing. 277 Such application suggests that clothing choices often in-
corporate a sufficiently expressive element to invoke First Amendment
protection. 278 Lastly, the fact that the conduct subject to regulation is an
element of a theatrical production suggests that the conduct is suffi-
270 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404, 407 (1989); Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61; United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); United States v. Wilson, 33 M.J. 797, 799-801
(A.C.M.R. 1991).
271 Sec Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404; Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61.
272 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
273 See, e.g., Wilson, 33 M.J. at 799-801,
274 See City of Erie v. Pap's AM., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404;
Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61.
272 Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61.
276 SeeJohnson, 491 U.S. at 404; Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61.
277 See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
278 Sec, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403; supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
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ciently expressive. 279 The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that per-
forming an erotic dance without clothing is a form of expressive con-
duct. 28° If a clothing choice in that performance context is sufficiently
expressive to invoke speech protections, then surely the choice to wear
a military uniform while reenacting an ongoing conflict for the pur-
pose of political protest merits at least equivalent recognition. 281 Con-
sequently, the conduct subject to regulation in this circumstance is ex-
pressive, and, therefore, the first prerequisite for the application of the
O'Brien test is satisfied. 282
Additionally, the application of the O'Brien. standard to this context
is appropriate because the government has an interest in regulating the
wearing of military uniforms in politically themed theatrical produc-
tions, and that interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion. 288 The government has a legitimate interest in maintaining civil-
ian supremacy over the military and in maintaining good order and
discipline within the nailitary. 284 The incorporation of a military uni-
form into an act of political protest could suggest that either the mili-
tary in general or some senicemembers in particular are disinclined to
accept orders from military superiors or the civilian establishment. 285
Consequently, the regulation of such conduct could advance important
government interests which are distinguishable from the suppression
free expression for its own sake, and therefore the second prerequisite
for the application of the O'Brien test is satisfied. 286
Lastly, the application of the O'Brien test to restrictions on the
wearing of military uniforms by IRR members during guerrilla theater
performances is appropriate because the O'Brien test properly ac-
commodates the special concerns that may arise in the context of dis-
putes within the military. 287 In 1991, in United States v. Wilson, the U.S.
Army Court of Military Review held that application of the O'Brien test
to expressive conduct by an active duty servicemember properly bal-
anced the needs of government in promoting a disciplined military
279 See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289.
288 See id.
281 Cf. id.
282 See id.; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404; Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61.
282 See Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61; Vagts, supra note 60, at 188-89; see also Johnson, 491 U.S.
at 407.
284 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,839 (1976); Vagts, supra note 60, at 188-89; see also
Warren, supra note 60, at 186.
285 See Vagts, supra note 60, at 188-89; cf. Greer, 424 U.S. at 839.
288 See Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61; see also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
287 See Wilson, 33 M.J. at 799-801.
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with the rights guaranteed to servicemembers by the First Amend-
ment. 288 Given that, in Wilson, an appellate court within the military
justice system embraced the O'Brien test as sufficiently protective of
military interests within an active duty context, it seems likely that the
test would similarly accommodate the more attenuated military inter-
ests in the regulation of IRR members' expressive conduct. 289
In summary, the O'Brien test. is appropriate for evaluating the con-
stitutionality of restrictions on the wearing of military uniforms by IRR
members during guerrilla theater performances because the conduct
in question is expressive, the government interest advanced by such
regulation is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the
analysis properly protects the unique interests inherent to the military
con tex t. 29°
D. Restrictions Do Not Satisfy the Expressive Conduct Standard
The ultimate question in this Note is whether the First Amend-
ment permits the military to restrict by regulation the wearing of mili-
tary uniforms by IRR members acting in guerrilla theater productions
to a greater degree than the government generally restricts similar
expression by persons with no military affiliation. 291 The O'Brien test
conclusively demonstrates that the First Amendment does not permit
the military to impose such additional restrictions. 292
Such restrictions fail the first prong of the O'Brien test because the
military lacks the constitutional authority to forbid by regulation what
Congress has permitted by statute. 2" The Constitution grants Congress
the plenary power to raise and support military forces and to make
rules for their governance. 294 This power extends to the regulation of
the wearing of military uniforms by servicemembers and civilians.295
Congress has authorized persons not on active duty to wear a military
uniform while acting in a theatrical production, a term which encom-
passes guerrilla theater performances. 296 Until recalled to service, IRR
288 See id.
289 Cf. id.
29° See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404, 407; Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61; Wilson, 33 M.J. at 799-801.
291 See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
292 See 391 U.S. at 377.
295 See id.; supra note 191 and accompanying text.
294 See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 447; Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301; supra note 191 and accompany-
ing text.
295 See Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61.
296 10 U.S.C. § 772(f); see Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61-62.
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members are not on active duty. 297
 Therefore, Congress has exercised
its constitutional authority to authorize IRR members to wear military
uniforms while acting in guerrilla theater performances. 298
 Conse-
quently, any military regulation which purports to restrict such activities
is unsupported by, and runs counter to, the judgment of Congress con-
cerning a topic over which the legislative branch possesses primary au-
thority. 299
 Because the first prong of the O'Brien test requires that the
regulation be within the constitutional power of the government, and
because the military regulation at issue does not obey the will of Con-
gress in an area over which the Constitution assigns Congress primary
control, the regulation at issue does not satisfy the first prong of the
O'Brien test."
Additionally; these restrictions fail the second prong of the
O'Brien test because forbidding IRE. members to wear military uni-
forms in circumstances in which civilians may wear military uniforms
advances no important or substantial government interest.m Limiting
the rights of IRR members to wear military uniforms while acting in
politically themed theatrical productions could advance two distinct
government interests: civilian supremacy and military discipline. 902
Once persons with no military affiliation are permitted to engage in
such behavior, however, the government interests in the restriction of
such expression by IRR members evaporate." First, the government
interest in maintaining civilian supremacy ceases to apply because the
audience typically has no means of distinguishing between uniformed
actors who are IRR members and those who no longer have or have
never had any military affiliation. 9" Accordingly; the participation of
IRR members in guerrilla theater performances does not add any im-
plication of military rebellion that is not already present, as the audi-
ence cannot know if the actors performing possess any affiliation with
the military.995
 Second,' the government interest in maintaining good
order and discipline within the military ceases to be threatened by the
2" See 10 U.S.C. § 10144.
298 See id. § 772(f); Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61-62.
299 See 10 U.S.C. § 772(f); Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61-62.
3°° See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; supra note 191 and accompanying text.
3°1 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
302 See Vagts, supra note 60, at 188-89; see also Warren, supra note 60, at 186.
80s See NICOSIA, supra note 24, at 101 (describing attempts by President Nixon to ex-
ploit the public's inability to determine whether persons in uniform were actually veterans
in order to discredit VVAW).
3°4 See id.
3°8 See id.
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participation of IRR members in guerrilla theater performances, be-
cause IRR members are not significantly more connected to military
society than persons with no military affiliation. 306 IRR members live
and work as civilians and, in the course of performing IRR-related
duties, interact rarely, if at all, with other military servicemernbers." 7
Since IRR members have essentially no greater interaction with the
military than persons with no military affiliation, it seems unlikely
that IRR members' participation in guerrilla theater could inflict on
the military any greater disruption than is already present as a result
of guerrilla theater performances by persons with no military affilia-
tion."8 Consequently, once persons with no military affiliation are
permitted to act in guerrilla theater productions, restricting the par-
ticipation of IRR members in similar productions ceases to advance
any important or substantial government interest." 9
The O'Brien test dictates that the military may not restrict the
wearing of uniforms by IRR members participating in guerrilla thea-
ter performances as long as Congress has authorized all persons not
on active duty to engage in such expression."' The military not only
lacks the constitutional authority to contradict the will of Congress,
but also advances no important or substantial government interest by
enforcing such restrictions."' Therefore, such restrictions violate the
guarantees of the First Amen dmen t.312
CONCLUSION
The government has punished members of IRR for engaging in
uniform-related expression that is generally permissible. Although sev-
eral First Amendment standards are available, the test enunciated by
the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien is the most relevant to
evaluating the constitutionality of such a restriction. The military lacks
the constitutional authority to impose the restriction, and the govern-
ment lacks an interest in more strictly regulating expression by IRR
members. Consequently, the first two prongs of the O'Brien test are not
306 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
307 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
308 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
(/9 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
31° Sea ed.
"I See U,S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; Solorlo, 483 U.S. at 447-48; Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301;
Vagts, supra note 60, at 188-89; see also Warren, supra note 60, at 186.
81 Sec O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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satisfied, and the First Amendment forbids such additional restrictions
on the speech of IRR members.
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